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Abstract 
The orthodox approach for incentivising Demand Side Participation (DSP) programs 
is that utility losses from capital, installation and planning costs should be recovered 
under financial incentive mechanisms which aim to ensure that utilities have the right 
incentives to implement DSP activities. The recent national smart metering roll-out in 
the UK implies that this approach needs to be reassessed since utilities will recover 
the capital costs associated with DSP technology through bills. This paper introduces 
a reward and penalty mechanism focusing on residential users. DSP planning costs 
are recovered through payments from those consumers who do not react to peak 
signals. Those consumers who do react are rewarded by paying lower bills. Because 
real-time incentives to residential consumers tend to fail due to the negligible amounts 
associated with net gains (and losses) for individual users, in the proposed mechanism 
the regulator determines benchmarks which are matched against responses to signals 
and caps the level of rewards/penalties to avoid market distortions. The paper presents 
an overview of existing financial incentive mechanisms for DSP; introduces the 
reward/penalty mechanism aimed at fostering DSP under the hypothesis of smart 
metering roll-out; considers the costs faced by utilities for DSP programs; assesses 
linear rate effects and value changes; introduces compensatory weights for those 
consumers who have physical or financial impediments; and shows findings based on 
simulation runs on three discrete levels of elasticity. 
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1. Introduction 
High peak demand on the electricity grid creates significant impacts on system costs 
because of the need for higher marginal cost generation, higher cost system balancing 
and increasing grid reinforcement investment. Demand Side Management programs 
use rates, incentives and other strategies to help better manage electricity use during 
periods of high peak demand (Bilton et al., 2008). Those Demand Side Management 
initiatives involving direct participation from the consumer side, which in this paper 
we call ‘Demand Side Participation’ (DSP) programs, can in principle bring about 
significant reductions in electricity prices, as demand-driven shifts of demand during 
peaks could reduce marginal costs (Faraqui, 2005). In practice, DSP programs can 
only work upon two conditions. First, DSP can only operate in the absence of 
asymmetries of information. A constant exchange of information between the 
provider and the consumer via two-way communication systems should operate under 
price sensitive technologies. The roll-out of smart metering technology aims to reduce 
asymmetries of information by covering large portions of consumer population and 
ensuring immediate access to information regarding consumption (Torriti et al, 2010). 
Second, the demand side should respond to the signals inputted by the provider. There 
are various ways of fostering active demand participation, namely through changes in 
price structures, information programs and incentives. This paper focuses on the 
latter, focusing on rewards and penalties for the consumers.  
 
The extensive theoretical literature on planning Demand Side Management  agrees 
that one major reason why DSP programs are not effective is because of the absence 
of electricity providers’ incentives to use DSP (Wirl, 1995; Fisher, 2005; Faruqui et 
al., 2010). The existing literature is based on the concept that providers may see DSP 
programs as sub-optimal due to the losses associated with reductions in demand 
which exceed gains associated with marginal decreases in generation costs and 
imports. The orthodox rationale is that losses from capital costs, installations and 
planning DSP should be recovered under financial incentive mechanisms such as Cost 
Recovery Mechanisms, Lost Revenue Mechanisms. The case of massive smart 
metering roll-out in the UK, means that suppliers have already faced capital costs 
(about £340 per household) and recouped them from customers through higher bills or 
upfront fees. 
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We ensure that planning costs of DSP programs are still recovered so that providers 
make up for such costs by receiving payments from consumers for not reacting to 
price signals. In addition, those consumers who proactively engage in shifting their 
loads and significantly react to price signals will be rewarded by paying less for their 
electricity consumption. Because real-time rewards to consumers tend to fail due to 
the negligable amounts associated with gains (and losses) for a single consumer 
(Dulleck and Kaufmann, 2004), in the approach presented here, the regulator 
determines cumulative benchmarks which are matched against responses to price 
signals. 
 
This paper commences with a brief overview of existing financial incentive 
mechanisms for DSP (Section 2). It presents a price mechamism aimed at fostering 
DSP programs (Section 3). It considers the costs  faced by utilities for DSP programs 
(Section 4) and rate effects and value changes (Section 5). Since the objectives should 
be set in a way that proportionally penalises non-active consumers, the mechanism 
should guarrantee that consumers who have any sort of impedement to responsiveness 
will not pay excessively for their performance (Section 6). Findings based on 
simulation runs on three levels of elasticity are presented (Section 7). The conclusion 
reflect on the implications and challenges associated with the proposed mechanism 
(Section 8). 
 
2. Financial incentive mechanisms for providers 
Existing financial mechanisms by regulators to incentivise DSP programs focus 
almost exclusively on providers. It is assumed that providers will have to pay for the 
absence of technological investments in DSP. The idea behind the financial schemes 
in place in the United States, Canada, Australia and India is that losses from capital 
costs, installations and planning DSP should be recovered under mechanisms such as 
cost recovery mechanisms, lost revenue mechanisms and shared savings incentive 
mechanisms based on performance. 
 
Cost recovery mechanisms are designed to eliminate the business incentive to 
underspend on DSP programs. They allow providers to recover the capital and 
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installation costs. The utilities costs for DSP are usually “expensed,” approved by 
regulators and sometimes amortised over several years. Interest is charged on under -
or over- recoveries. Because under cost recovery mechanisms the providers costs are 
amortised over several years, the economic significance of load shifting is lost. In 
other words, the behavioural learning on the consumer side is very limited. 
 
Lost revenue mechanisms pay providers back for the direct losses that they experience 
due to decreases in electricity sold. Lost revenues associated with reductions in total 
amounts of sold electricity are partly offset by a reduction or avoidance of variable 
costs -e.g. the cost of fuel for power plants. The typology of opportunity costs often 
included in lost revenue mechanisms include recovery of all of the revenues that 
providers would have benefited from had they not promoted DSP programs. Lost 
revenue mechanisms are designed to make DSP revenue-neutral and eliminate the 
incentive to minimise savings from DSP. This leaves the provider financially 
indifferent to the level of DSP achieved. A practical example of lost revenue 
mechanism can be exemplified through the Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism, a 
means to compensate for lost revenues in Canada. In a given year, the provider 
calculates the amount of volume or kWh losses due to its own DSP programs. This 
must be calculated net of any efficiency trends occurring independently of DSP, since 
sales losses due to other factors would have been experienced anyway. 
 
Lost revenue mechanisms are designed to make DSP revenue-neutral and eliminate 
the incentive to minimise savings from DSP.  This leaves the provider financially 
indifferent as to the level of DSP that is achieved. The provider gets reward for its 
DSP losses. If services delivered go down as a result of DSP activities, all other things 
being equal, rates will go up so that costs may be recovered. This means that all 
consumers pay for lack of responsiveness. Instead, it would be much preferable if 
only the least responsive consumers had to pay. 
 
Shared Savings Incentive Mechanisms are designed to provide rewards to utilities 
based on the effectiveness of socially beneficial DSP. These mechanisms can 
compensate for energy savings associated with DSP by making it possible for the 
provider to share the consumer net benefits from DSP programs. In principle, 
penalties for underperformance can also be part of a Shared Savings Incentive 
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Mechanism, but have not been implemented. This creates a business case for 
sustainable DSP initiatives that promote energy efficiency on an evolving, adaptive, 
multi-year basis. A pre-condition of Shared Savings Incentive Mechanisms is that the 
regulator determines DSP target levels on providers. This can represent a forecasting 
problem under different (e.g. temperature) conditions that might induce peak loads. 
For instance, a share or percentage of actual DSP net benefits over the target level 
determined by the regulator can be apportioned to the provider in the form of a 
positive rate adjustment. In other words, the aim of Shared Savings Incentive 
Mechanisms is to remunerate a provider to achieve more than the targets approved by 
the regulator. However, it is difficult to make incentives dependent upon objective 
verification. 
 
In addition to the points raised above for each of the mechanisms, at least three 
common planning problems can be related to all three mechanisms. First, they all 
focus on network and generation capacity recovery rather than consumer learning. 
Incentives concentrate mostly on recuperation of costs on the provider side rather than 
ensuring that consumers improve their demand participation. Second, in all three 
mechanisms establishing the level of incentives for providers is challenging for the 
first year. Third, they all build on the hypothesis that capital costs associated with 
technological investment have to be met by providers. The model put forward in this 
paper transcends these problems by: (i) considering consumer performance in terms 
of demand participation; (ii) developing a mechanism to determine the level of 
rewards and penalties based on DSP performance; and (iii) excluding some 
technological investment costs from the mechanism. The third point suits national 
roll-out plans, where the capital costs of smart meters are recouped from consumers 
through higher bills or upfront fees. In other words, rewards and penalties can be 
based on consumer responses to price signals and yet ensure that providers planning 
costs are recovered. 
 
3. Reward/penalty mechanism 
The economic agents involved in the DSP mechanism are consumers, utilities and a 
regulatory agency. Time runs in a discrete sequence of periods indexed by the period 
unit t . There are c consumers, producing c different responses to price signals 
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typically under high peak periods. We assume that the market where the mechanism is 
introduced is competitive, so consumers take prices as given. The regulatory agency 
has the power to allow changes in prices under DSP programs. 
At the beginning of each period, benchmarks are established according to overall 
consumers’ performance in the previous period. The benchmark (Bn) for the time t is 
obtained as a result of performance for the previous period using level of 
reward/penalty α: 
 
Bnt = Bnt-1 (1-αt) 
 
If consumers overall reacted more frequently to price signals at the time t-1, than at 
the time t-2, then α will increase for the next period t.  
The level of α, where 0<α<1, for one period is dependent on performance in the 
previous period, according to standard incentive model (Kahn, 2002), based on the 
following regulator’s problem 
 
αt = max β%; 	1 −  
                                                          (1) 
 
where Meast-1 is the measured consumer responsiveness for the previous period, Bnt-1  
is the benchmark for the previous period, and  is the minimum number of responsive 
actions that consumers can undertake for the period t. 
 
Each consumer will be faced with the choice to respond to price signals more 
frequently than the benchmark level in order to get rewards. If the consumer responds 
to price signals less frequently than the benchmark level the consumer will pay 
penalties. 
 
The level of reward/penalty should be minimum β%. The minimum number of 
responsive actions that one consumer can undertake in one year can be determined as 
percentage of continuous annual supply. Hypothtically, contingent valuation surveys 
can help both identify how much British consumers are willing to pay (WTP) and 
refine the parameters for determining the rewards/penalties ratio between for the 
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baseline period. The WTP value can define the maximum number of responsive 
actions that one consumer can undertake in one year, as percentage of continuous 
annual supply. A related approach has been used to value distribution tariffs in the 
residential sector in Sweden (Bartusch et al, 2011; Bartusch et al, 2010). However, the 
actual use of contingent valuation for valuing changes in electricity tariffs may be 
problematic, as envisaged in studies using contingent valuation in order to value WTP 
for improving the quality of supply (Ajodhia et al, 2006); energy saving measures 
(Banfi et al, 2008); and renewable energy (Wiser, 2007; Nomura and Akai, 2004). 
The main problem with contingent valuation surveys relates to higher WTP disclosed 
by residential users when the public good is supplied through a collective scheme than 
when individual payment mechanisms –like the one introduced in this paper- are 
applied. 
 
Each period t consumers are rewarded or penalised according to their measured 
performance Measc,t. For instance, if a consumer reacted 7 times to 11 price signals by 
the provider to reduce or shift loads, then Meas=0.63. Unitary reward/penalty 
parameters are set ex ante at the beginning of the year. Reward and penalty 
parameters are capped  
 
Min (α_cap) ≤ αc ≤ Max (α_cap)  
 
in order to limit volatility of retail prices. For every t, the price-cap reflects the 
changes in rewards and penalties. The incentive system is funded through penalties 
paid by those consumers whose responsiveness targets are not met, and for the net 
difference between rewards and penalties, through adding an R-factor in the 
conventional price-cap formula: 
 
price_capα = RPI – X ± Rc,t 
 
where RPI represents the Retail Price Index and X are the expected efficiency savings. 
The subtraction RPI-X represents the conventional price-cap formula (Sibley, 1989), 
whereas R can be seen as the factor that varies ex post for each year t based on 
measured responsiveness:  
 
8 
 
Rt =  ∑ (Bn,!	–	Meas,!)()  × +,-./01234                                                                                               (2) 
 
Where Rt is responsiveness factor for the period t, Cgen is the generation cost (in 
hr/kWh), Bnc,t  is the active demand participation benchmark set ex ante for each type 
of consumer c for each year t. Consumer responsiveness is determined by Measc,t 
which is measured response activities for each type of consumer c for year t (in 
minutes). 
 
The R factor for the period t is determined as a result of the sum of all benchmark 
levels minus measured consumer responsiveness multiplied by the provider cost of 
generation under DSP programs. 
 
Thus far we have defined the basic equations for determining the objectives of 
responsivess for individual consumers (benchmarks), levels of rewards (αc) and cap 
values (price_capα). The mechanism consists of price signals from the provider in 
case of peak loads, when Cgen is higher than usual at the time t1. The signal is inputted 
through the DSP program j to the consumer c who decides whether to respond to it (in 
which case Measc,t increases) or not (in which case Measc,t decreases). Determining 
Cgen is vital in order to assess αc as well the efficiency of the DSP programme 
according to the provider. 
 
4. Costs for providers 
This section investigates the cost of planning DSP programs attributable to each 
customer c for not responding to price signals. How much each provider will spend 
can be determined as non-DSP cost of generation plus cost of DSP values 
 
Cgen = ∑ c  G + ∑ [(1 − α88 )d:8] DSPj                                                               (3) 
 
where ;<is the generation for consumer c (expressed in MW), =<is the generation cost 
for consumer c (in £/MWh), DSPj  are the energy savings associated with the DSP 
program j (in MW), >?@is the provider cost for the DSP program j (in £/MWh), and A@is the percentage of provider cost consisting of rewards (e.g. monetary transfers) to 
participants in programme j. 
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Equation (3) quantifies the generation cost which becomes necessary for consumer 
not responding to price signals (∑ =<<  ;<, which includes increasing loading cycles, 
start-up and shut-down costs of power systems), and the avoided savings from DSP 
with a % of provider costs consisting of rewards to participants (∑ [(1 − A@@ )>?@] 
DSPj). 
 
Equation (3) provides the level of cost to the provider of generation and DSP actions. 
It provides a simple and fair characterization of the dynamics for valuing generation. 
However, it ignores details with regards to temporal variability of loads, costs and 
generator availability. This is because some of the capital costs necessary for DSP 
technologies are already met via recouping costs of smart meters. Scale economies in 
DSP programs and non-linear heat rates are not taken into account. Complications 
associated with interaction between different DSP programs, energy-limited units and 
storage are not considered because they are not necessary for the purpose of this 
model, which is to show how changes in total value can be included in the 
reward/penalty mechanism (Decanio and Laitne, 1997).  
 
In terms of generation costs, each provider is disposed to pay according to an A@ 
percentage to responsive consumers for programme j, as follows: 
 
α8 =	 (,EF	∑ GG 	HG) ∑ (I JKI)	LMNI	O                                                                   (4) 
 
where n is the number of DSP programs implemented by the provider. Compared to 
the estimate of αc made by the regulatory agency, the provider choice on αj is 
characterised by cost minimisation constraints. While the regulator faces an 
effectiveness problem (i.e. maximising rewards and penalties, while keeping weak 
consumers safe), providers face an efficiency problem (i.e. finding the right level of 
rewards to DSP programs). How can these two different problems be reconciled? 
 
Firstly, the responsiveness factor in Equation (2) should include the cost of generation 
faced by utilities of Equation (3) 
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Rt =  ∑ (Bn,!	–	Meas,!)()  +∑ ccc 	Gc	+	∑ [(1−αjj )duj]	DSPj0123 4                                           (5). 
 
Secondly, the two different levels of rewards should be made equal in order to 
calculate the appropriate level for the decision variable ;<. Hence, combining (1) and 
(4) 
(Cgen −	∑ c 	G)∑ (8 d:8)	DSP8	Z = 	1 − [Meas
)\Bn ]
)! 																																								(6). 
 
All loads must be met either by normal generating power or additional generating 
power. For this reason the model includes the following demand constraints and upper 
bounds on the provider’s decision variables ;< and	_`a@: 
 D = ∑ DSPj +8  ∑ G   
 
0	≤ G ≤ cap     ∀	= 
0	≤ DSP8 ≤ D∗ 						∀	e 
 
where D is the total demand, i.e. the sum of non participating loads (loads that would 
not be directly affected by any DSP programme) and potential participants that would 
not be eliminated by any DSP programme; D∗  is MW demand by potentially 
participating programs that would be eliminated if DSP measures are implemented. 
The constraints limit unit generation and the size of the DSP programme and cap is 
the capacity of generating unit c. 
 
5. Rate effects and value changes 
The above mechanism does not take into account the effect of costs on rates and 
loads. The costs estimated by the above model are fed into a financial mechanism that 
calculates rates according to a reward/penalty mechanism. If the resulting rates differ 
from those assumed in forecasting the loads in the reward/penalty mechanism, then 
those loads could be adjusted. Rate determination can be made internal to a model by 
adding a restriction, e.g. a revenue requirement equation (Braeutigam and Panzar, 
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1993). This restriction specifies that the revenue received by the provider should 
cover its cost plus any consumer rewards that might be offered, for example, for 
pursuing DSP. For simplicity, the complications of multiple customer classes and 
nonlinear rate schedules will be ignored. 
 
P	(Q −	gDSP8) = (k +	gcG +	gd:,8	DSP8)8 																																											(7)8  
 
Where a is the price of electricity (expressed in £/MWh), i is the capital and fixed 
operations and maintenance costs to be recovered from rates (in £/h), and Q
 
is the 
potential MW load. 
 
The left term in (7) is the provider’s revenue and the right term is the provider’s cost. 
It means that price times actual MWh load, equal to the potential load Q minus 
savings due to DSP programs. Calculations related to rate-induced changes in loads 
are essential both for accurate estimates of the costs of serving those loads and to 
understand how these would affect the total value received by consumers.  
 
6. Weights for disadvantaged electricity consumers (physical and mobility 
disabilities, severe illness, number of dependent children) 
The incentive/payment scheme implies that consumers are tasked with the objective 
of improving the way they respond to price signals year by year. The pressure on 
active participation would be high on all types of consumers. However, the regulator 
might want to protect those consumers who for various reasons have limited ability to 
respond when it comes to shifting loads.  
 
Weights should be included in the scheme to compensate the negative distributional 
impacts associated with the introduction of the incentive/payment scheme, 
particularly on disadvantaged electricity consumers. One of the criticalities of 
incentive-payment schemes is that they might increase disparities by penalising those 
who strive to pay energy bills. Elements of impedement to responsiveness (e.g. 
physical and mobility disabilities, severe illness, number of dependant children) could 
be factored into the mechanism: 
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αt = max jβ%; 	1 − l mnonp q
r                                                 (8) 
 
where z is the disability rating, y is the number of days per year of severe illness, and 
x is the number of children per parent.  
 
Although allocative efficiency is less tangible than productive efficiency, the 
introduction of weights for disadvantaged electricity consumers might be as important 
for the success of mechanism as rates charged for non-disadvantaged consumers.  
 
7. Mechanism simulation  
The relationship between stuv<,w and price elasticity x	<,w is given by  
 
yZ j1 − l mnonp q
r = 	 x	=,z                                                               (9) 
 
Mechanism simulations are run for three discrete levels of elasticity -based on UK 
implied price elasticities from Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001)- and retail electricity 
prices in the UK (IEA, 2011), which feed in to Cgen and Rt as described in Equations 
(3) and (5).  
 
The three elasticity levels are assumed to cover aggregate responses to similar 
conditions in prices, reflecting also key factors like weather conditions. The β 
percentages vary depending on different segments of the residential sector. A standard 
econometric simulation software (Betahat) was applied. The different number of 
simulation runs is a consequence of the differences in number of observations 
associated with the timing of benchmarks setting and intervals for αt levels. 
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Table 1-Mechanism run for }	~, =	−.  (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
Bnt [Meas!F) )\Bn!F) ]
)!
 
Rt	 αt 
),w 0.142 (0.014) -0.092 (0.012) 0.102 (0.008) -0.136 (0.009) 
,w 0.146 (0.026) -0.025 (0.018) 0.014 (0.028) -0.044 (0.015) 
,w 0.090 (0.033) -0.025 (0.026) 0.031 (0.019) 0.020 (0.020) 
,w 0.089 (0.020) -0.004 (0.016) 0.007 (0.014) 0.003 (0.016) 
,w 0.057 (0.028) 0.018 (0.017) 0.019 (0.015) -0.012 (0.017) 
2,w 0.194 (0.043) -0.033 (0.023) 0.057 (0.012) -0.027 (0.023) 
Simulation 
runs 
1031 1340 804 854 
 
 Table 1 presents the mechanism run for negative elasticities (}	~, =	−. ). 
Findings show that non-responsive end-users are strongly penalised as demonstrated 
by negative αt values in the last column to the right. A higher benchmark level (Bnt) 
affects more strongly negative αt values. This reflects the fact that a higher 
performance is expected by those end-users who achieved higher levels of 
responsiveness in previous periods. The most evident example is from the comparison 
of , with ,. End-users who intentionally vary their performance throughout 
periods in order to gain from higher rewards will not be able to free-ride. This means 
that the opportunities for end-users to play with variations from one measurement 
period to the other is very limited as changes in Rt  control for the past performance. 
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Table 2-Mechanism run for }	~, = 	.  (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
Bnt [Meas!F) )\Bn!F) ]
)!
 
Rt	 αt 
),w 0.122 (0.011) 0.033 (0.002) 0.121 (0.013) 0.005 (0.009) 
,w 0.116 (0.020) 0.010 (0.028) 0.072 (0.032) 0.003 (0.015) 
,w 0.011 (0.031) 0.009 (0.013) 0.051 (0.020) 0.031 (0.020) 
,w 0.072 (0.016) 0.024 (0.011) 0.031 (0.016) 0.013 (0.016) 
,w 0.074 (0.035) 0.018 (0.007) 0.019 (0.013) 0.023 (0.017) 
2,w 0.187 (0.041) 0.012 (0.018) 0.041 (0.022) 0.057 (0.023) 
Simulation 
runs 
1031 1340 804 854 
 
Turning to 	, = 	. ,  parameter estimates in Table 2 are all positive and 
significantly different from zero at a one percent critical level. A higher overall 
elasticity condition is reflected by positive αt. This means that αt becomes positive 
when a higher number of end-users react to signals. For example, the αt value of , varies from -0.012 in Table 1 to 0.023 in Table 2. The increments in Rt are more 
than proportional in comparison with negative elasticity levels, because planning 
costs marginally decrease. This is demonstrated, for instance, by the Rt value of , which goes from 0.014 in Table 1 to 0.072 in Table 2. It should be noticed that 
the initial penalty reward level is very low. For the same levels of elasticity, a lower 
simulation run is associated with lower levels of αt. 
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Table 3-Mechanism run for }	~, = 	.  (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
Bnt [Meas!F) )\Bn!F) ]
)!
 
Rt	 αt 
),w 0.121 (0.012) 0.021 (0.015) 0.111 (0.017) 0.006 (0.008) 
,w 0.118 (0.015) 0.023 (0.014) 0.053 (0.029) 0.004 (0.009) 
,w 0.015 (0.027) 0.015 (0.025) 0.053 (0.031) 0.026 (0.021) 
,w 0.045 (0.012) 0.051 (0.021) 0.023 (0.018) 0.020 (0.014) 
,w 0.064 (0.037) 0.015 (0.011) 0.021 (0.011) 0.021 (0.015) 
2,w 0.095 (0.031) 0.013 (0.022) 0.052 (0.029) 0.061 (0.021) 
Simulation 
runs 
1031 1340 804 854 
 
 
Finally, the parameter estimates in Table 3 indicate that for high average elasticity (}	~, = 	. ) the most responsive end-users significantly reduce bills thanks to 
high αt levels associated with DSP planning. As expected, the measured consumer 
responsiveness for the previous period increases, while the benchmark levels for the 
previous period vary. For example, the  
l
nn
 q


value of ,  decreases between Table 2 and Table 3, whereas the 
corresponding value for , increases in correspondence of higher elasticity levels. 
 
The paper does not take into account the aggregated effect of all consumers’ action. 
This is partly because the mechanism is designed to be run at the national level, with 
discrete users picked across the country, with limited interaction amd opportunities to 
influence each other’s consumption behaviour. It is however useful, in addition to the 
quantitative simulation presented above, to reflect on some two borderline cases: first, 
that all end users respond to all signals at all times and, second, that no consumer 
respnds to any of the signals. The first case equates perfect elasticity (i.e. } ~, = 1).  
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8. Conclusions 
The paper responds to the double need identified in the existing Demand Side 
Management literature to create sufficient incentives to providers for planning 
programs (Schultz and Lineweber, 2006) and to establish a regulatory framework to 
optimise the potential of DSP (Strbac, 2008). Unlike other existing rewards/penalty 
mechanisms which focus on the provider as the agent who should be incentivised to 
trigger DSP, the proposed mechanism is centred on consumers. It assumes that most 
of the capital costs associated with DSP have been (or will be) paid for as in the case 
of the smart metering roll-out in the UK. This paper has not addressed the question of 
what the best vehicle might be for putting the rewards and penalties into place and 
whether the mechanism is easy to understand. With regards to best vehicle, in 
principle, the payments and rewards should occur at the bill level. The information on 
how the mechanism works and the risks of higher bills could also be explained 
through bills prior to the implementation of the DSP program, as for instance happens 
in Italy with Time of Use tariffs (CRU, 2010). Whilst the epistemology of the 
mechanism developed in this paper is apparently rather complex, partly due to the 
integration of providers’ costs, rate effects and value changes, its ontology is fairly 
uncomplicated. Consumers are expected to understand the bottom line, namely that if 
they manage to respond to peak signals they will pay lower bills, whereas if they fails 
to do so, they will have to pay higher bills. The effectiveness of the metering 
technology in putting across a peak signal, through e.g. lights, sounds etc, will 
certainly play a vital role in the understanding of the mechanism. 
 
Incentive mechanisms can only be successful if they combine incentives for cost 
reductions with freedom on price balancing (Vogelsang, 2002). The effectiveness of 
the mechanism is likely to depend on the capacity of measuring consumption 
decreases following a peak signal. Existing models on time of use (see Richardson et 
al, 2008) suggest that monitoring of domestic consumption in 10 minute interval 
might be able to capture responses to signals. Further research is needed to establish 
what level of peak reduction (in kWh) could be considered a sizeable response to the 
price signal. 
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One of the criticalities of the DSP mechanism is the shift in risk for both providers 
and consumers. Providers will bear additional risks, because if their planning costs 
rise, their profits will fall because they cannot raise their prices to compensate for the 
cost increases. Only financially advantaged consumers might be able to benefit from 
the DSP mechanism and take the risk of paying higher bills for poor performance. 
One way to prevent the first criticality is to ensure that at consistent intervals (e.g. 
under the Price Control Review) the regulator reviews the objectives for the levels of 
rewards and penalties, as it occurs under the Quality of Supply regulation. In order to 
prevent the second criticality and encourage active demand participation of all 
residential consumers, while limiting volatility in the market and protecting ‘weaker’ 
consumers, objectives should be set so that different benchmarks should be applied to 
different consumers. 
 
The highly electric low carbon future envisaged in UK energy and climate change 
policies (CCC 2008; UKERC 2009) implies that large portions of heat demand will 
largely be supplied by electricity. This will add considerably to the peaks in electricity 
demand unless DSP is implemented to shift these peaks to lower-demand times in the 
diurnal cycle. For instance, air source heat pumps add significantly to peak electricity 
demand because manufacturers typically install direct electric resistive backup 
heating in devices. According to the UK National Grid, peak demand in Britain is 
currently around 60GW. With air source heat pumps, peak demand in Britain is likely 
to increase by tens of GW. This is because the peak demand of a domestic heat pump 
will be around 7kW. The aggregate effect of heat pumps may be around 1.3kW per 
home (Hawkes, 2010). 
 
Finally, the mechanism presented in this paper assumes a completely new type of 
consumer. The “responsive” consumers will have their performance measured and 
will either save or pay depending on the improvements to their active DSP. Further 
research in the spheres of environmental psychology and sociology is needed to 
understand issues of acceptance of such mechanism and behavioural risks from a 
consumer perspective. 
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